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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have shown vulnerabil-
ity to adversarial attacks, i.e., carefully perturbed inputs
designed to mislead the network at inference time. Re-
cently introduced localized attacks, Localized and Visible
Adversarial Noise (LaVAN) and Adversarial patch, pose a
new challenge to deep learning security by adding adver-
sarial noise only within a specific region without affecting
the salient objects in an image. Driven by the observation
that such attacks introduce concentrated high-frequency
changes at a particular image location, we have developed
an effective method to estimate noise location in gradient
domain and transform those high activation regions caused
by adversarial noise in image domain while having mini-
mal effect on the salient object that is important for correct
classification. Our proposed Local Gradients Smoothing
(LGS) scheme achieves this by regularizing gradients in the
estimated noisy region before feeding the image to DNN for
inference. We have shown the effectiveness of our method in
comparison to other defense methods including Digital Wa-
termarking, JPEG compression, Total Variance Minimiza-
tion (TVM) and Feature squeezing on ImageNet dataset. In
addition, we systematically study the robustness of the pro-
posed defense mechanism against Back Pass Differentiable
Approximation (BPDA), a state of the art attack recently de-
veloped to break defenses that transform an input sample to
minimize the adversarial effect. Compared to other defense
mechanisms, LGS is by far the most resistant to BPDA in
localized adversarial attack setting.
1. Introduction
Deep neural network architectures achieve remarkable
performance on critical applications of machine learning in-
cluding sensitive areas such as face detection [16], malware
detection [17] and autonomous driving [11]. However, the
vulnerability of DNNs to adversarial examples limit their
wide adoption in security critical applications [1]. It has
been shown that adversarial examples can be created by
minimally modifying the original input samples such that a
DNN mis-classifies them with high confidence. DNNs are
often criticized as black-box models; adversarial examples
raise further concerns by highlighting blind spots of DNNs.
At the same time, adversarial phenomena provide an oppor-
tunity to understand DNN’s behavior to minor perturbations
in visual inputs.
Methods that generate adversarial examples either mod-
ify each image pixel by a small amount [24, 8, 14, 13] of-
ten imperceptible to human vision or few image pixels by
a large visible amounts [20, 22, 4, 12, 7]. Pixel attack [22]
changes few image pixels, but it requires small images (e.g.,
32×32) and does not provide control over noise location.
Small noise patches were introduced by [20] in the form
of glasses to cover human face to deceive face recognition
systems. Similarly, Evtimov et al. [7] added noise patches
as rectangular patterns on top of traffic signs to cause mis-
classification. Very recently, localized adversarial attacks,
i.e., Adversarial patch [4] and LaVAN [12] have been intro-
duced that can be optimized for triplets (misclassification
confidence, target class, perturbed location). These practi-
cal attacks have demonstrated high strength and can easily
bypass existing defense approaches. Therefore they present
a significant challenge for existing deep learning systems.
Contributions: In this work, we study the behavior of
localized adversarial attacks and propose an effective mech-
anism to defend against them (see Fig. 1). LaVAN and Ad-
versarial patch add adversarial noise without affecting the
original object in the image, and to some extent, they are
complementary to each other. In an effort towards a strong
defense against these attacks, this paper contributes as fol-
lows:
• Motivated by the observation that localized adversar-
ial attacks introduce high-frequency noise, we pro-
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(a) Impala (94%) (b) Ice Lolly (99%) (c) Impala (94%)
(d) Squirrel Monkey (58%) (e) Toaster (91%) (f) Squirrel Monkey (57%)
Figure 1: Inception v3 [23] confidence scores are shown for example images. (a) and (d) represent benign examples from
ImageNet [18], (b) and (e) are adversarial examples generated by LaVAN [12] and Adversarial patch [4] respectively, (c) and
(f) show transformed adversarial images using our proposed LGS. As illustrated, LGS restores correct class confidences.
pose a transformation called Local Gradient Smooth-
ing (LGS). LGS first estimates region of interest in an
image with the highest probability of adversarial noise
and then performs gradient smoothing in only those re-
gions.
• We show that by its design, LGS significantly re-
duces gradient activity in the targeted attack region and
thereby showing the most resistance to BPDA [2], an
attack specifically designed to bypass transformation
based defense mechanisms.
• Our proposed defense outperforms other state-of-the-
art methods such as Digital watermarking, TVM,
JPEG compression, and Feature squeezing in localized
adversarial attacks setting [12, 4].
2. Related Work
Among the recent localized adversarial attacks, the fo-
cus of adversarial patch [4] is to create a scene indepen-
dent physical-world attack that is agnostic to camera angles,
lighting conditions and even the type of classifier. The re-
sult is an image independent universal noise patch that can
be printed and placed in the classifier’s field of view in a
white box (when deep network model is known) or black
box (when deep network model is unknown) setting. How-
ever, the size of the adversarial patch should be 10% of the
image for the attack to be successful in about 90% cases
[12]. This limitation was addressed by Karmoon et al. [12],
who focused on creating localized attack covering as little
as 2% of the image area instead of generating a universal
noise patch. In both of these attacks [4, 12], there is no
constraint on noise, and it can take any value within image
domain, i.e., [0, 255] or [0, 1].
Defense mechanisms against adversarial attacks can be
divided into two main categories. (a) Methods that modify
DNN by using adversarial training [25] or gradient masking
[15] and (b) techniques that modify input sample by using
some smoothing function to reduce adversarial effect with-
out changing the DNN [6, 5, 9, 26]. For example, JPEG
compression was first presented as a defense by [6] and re-
cently studied extensively by [5, 19]. [26] presented fea-
ture squeezing methods including bit depth reduction, me-
dian filtering, Gaussian filtering to detect and defend against
adversarial attacks. Guo et al. [9] considered smoothing
input samples by total variance minimization along with
JPEG compression and image quilting to reduce the adver-
sarial effect. Our work falls into the second category as
we also transform the input sample to defend against local-
ized adversarial attacks. However, as we will demonstrate
through experiments, the proposed defense mechanism pro-
vides better defense against localized attacks compared to
previous techniques.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3 discusses
localized adversarial attacks, LaVAN and Adversarial patch
in detail. Section 4 presents our defense approach (LGS)
against these attacks. We discuss other related defense
methods in Section 5.2. Section 5 demonstrates the ef-
fectiveness of the proposed method LGS in comparison
to other defense methods against LaVAN and adversarial
patch attacks. Section 5.3 discusses BPDA and resilience
of different defense methods against it. Section 6 concludes
the draft by discussing possible future directions.
3. Adversarial Attacks
In this section, we provide a brief background to adver-
sarial attacks and explain how LaVAN [12] and Adversarial
patch [4] are different from traditional attacks.
3.1. Traditional Attacks
The search for adversarial examples can be formulated as
a constrained optimization problem. Given a discriminative
classifier F(y |x), an input sample x ∈ Rn, a target class
y¯ and a perturbation budget , an attacker seeks to find a
modified input x′ = x + δ ∈ Rn with adversarial noise
δ to increase likelihood of the target class y¯ by solving the
following optimization problem:
max
x′
F(y = y¯ |x′)
subject to: ‖x− x′‖p ≤  (1)
This formulation produces well camouflaged adversarial
examples but changes each pixel in the image. Defense
methods such as JPEG compression [6, 5], Total variance
minimization [9] and Feature squeezing [26] are effective
against such attacks especially when the perturbation bud-
get  is not too high.
3.2. LaVAN
LaVAN [12] differs from the formulation presented in
Eq. 1 as it confines adversarial noise δ to a small region,
usually away from the salient object in an image. It uses
the following spatial mask to replace the small area with
noise, as opposed to noise addition performed in traditional
attacks:
x′ = (1−m) x+m δ, s.t.,m ∈ Rn and , (2)
where  is Hadamard product and δ represents adversarial
noise.
They also introduce a new objective function where at
each iteration, optimization algorithm takes a step away
from the source class and towards the target class simul-
taneously, as follows:
max
x′
F(y¯ |x′)−F(y |x′)
subject to: ‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ , 0 ≤  ≤ 1, (3)
where x′ is given by Eq. 2.
3.3. Adversarial Patch
Adversarial examples created using the methodology
presented in Eq. 1 cannot be used in physical world at-
tacks because adversarial noise loses its effect under differ-
ent camera angles, rotations and lighting conditions. Atha-
lye et al. [3] introduced an Expectation over Transformation
(EoT) attack to create robust adversarial examples invari-
ant to chosen set of transformations. Brown et al. [4] build
upon Athalye’s work and used EoT to create a scene in-
dependent robust noise patch confined to small region that
can be printed and placed in the classifier’s field of view
to cause misclassification. To generate adversarial patch p′,
[4] proposed a patch operatorA(p,x, l, t) for a given image
x, patch p, location l and a set of transformation t. During
optimization, patch operator A applies a set of transforma-
tions to the patch p and then projects it onto the image x at
a location l to increase likelihood of target class y¯.
p′ = max
p
Ex∼X,t∼T,l∼L[F(y¯ | A(p,x, l, t))] (4)
where X represent training images, T represents distribu-
tion over transformations, and L is a distribution over loca-
tions in the image.
4. Defense: Local Gradients Smoothing
Both of the above discussed attacks [12, 4] introduce
high frequency noise concentrated at a particular image lo-
cation and strength of such a noise becomes very prominent
in image gradient domain. We propose that the effect of
such adversarial noise can be reduced significantly by sup-
pressing high frequency regions without effecting the low
frequency image areas that are important for classification.
An efficient way to achieve this is by projecting scaled nor-
malized gradient magnitude map onto the image to directly
suppress high activation regions. To this end, we first com-
pute the magnitude of first-order local image gradients as
follows:
‖ ∇x(a, b) ‖=
√(
∂x
∂a
)2
+
(
∂x
∂b
)2
, (5)
where a, b denote the horizontal and vertical directions in
the image plane. The range of the gradient magnitude cal-
culated using the above equation is normalized for consis-
tency across an image as follows:
g(x) =
‖ ∇x(a, b) ‖ − ‖ ∇x(a, b) ‖min
‖ ∇x(a, b) ‖max − ‖ ∇x(a, b) ‖min . (6)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 2: (a) and (e) show adversarial examples generated by LaVAN [12] and adversarial patch [4] respectively, (b) and (f)
show normalized gradients magnitude before applying windowing operation to look for highest activation regions, (c) and (g)
show concept of window search to estimate noise regions, (d) and (h) show normalized gradients magnitude after applying
windowing operation. We refer to supplementary material for more examples.
The normalized gradient g(x) is projected onto the origi-
nal image to suppress noisy perturbations in the input data
domain. This operation smooths out very high frequency
image details. As demonstrated by our evaluations, these
regions have high likelihood of being perturbed areas, but
they do not provide significant information for final classi-
fication. The noise suppression is performed as follows:
T (x) = x (1− λ ∗ g(x)), (7)
where λ is the smoothing factor for LGS and λ ∗ g(x) is
clipped between 0 and 1. Applying this operation at a global
image level, however, introduces image structural loss that
causes a drop in classifier’s accuracy on benign examples.
To minimize this effect, we design a block-wise approach
where gradient intensity is evaluated within a local window.
To this end, we first divide the gradient magnitude map into
a total ofK overlapping blocks of same size (τ ) and then fil-
ter these blocks based on a threshold (γ) to estimate highest
activation regions which also have the highest likelihood of
adversarial noise. This step can be represented as follows:
g′h,w =W(g(x), h, w, τ, o) ∈ Rτ ,
gˆh,w =
{
g′h,w, if
1
|g′h,w|
∑
i
∑
j g
′
h,w(i, j) > γ
0, otherwise.
(8)
where | · | denotes the cardinality of each patch, o denotes
the patch overlap,W(·) represent the windowing operation,
h,w denote the vertical and horizontal components of the
top left corner of the extracted window, respectively. We set
the block size τ = 15×15 with 5×5 overlap and threshold
is 0.1 in all of our experiments. The updated gradient blocks
represented as gˆh,w are then collated to recreate the full gra-
dient image: g¯ = W−1({gˆh,w}K1 ). Figure 2 shows the ef-
fect of windowing search on gradients magnitude maps. We
further demonstrated LGS efficiency on challenging images
in supplementary material.
5. Experiments
5.1. Protocol and Results Overview
We used Inception v3 model [23] to experiment with var-
ious attack and defense mechanisms in all of our experi-
ments. All attacks are carried out in white-box settings. We
consider the validation set available with Imagenet-2012
dataset in our experiments. This set consists of a total of
50k images. We report top-1 accuracy of classifier. Results
are summarized in tables 1, 2 and 3.
LaVAN [12] can be optimized for triplets (target, con-
fidence, location) but it is highly sensitive to noise loca-
tion. Adversary loses its effect with even a small change to
the pixel location. To reduce the computational burden and
conduct experiments on a large scale, we randomly chose
noise location along border areas of the image because they
have the least probability to cover the salient object. We ran
No Attack 42x42 noise patch
covering ∼2% of image
52x52 noise patch
covering ∼3% of image
60x60 noise patch
covering ∼ 4% of image
No Defense 75.61% 11.00% 2.79% 0.78%
LGS [lambda=2.3] 71.05% 70.90% 69.84% 69.37%
LGS [lambda=2.1] 71.50% 70.80% 69.54% 68.56%
LGS [lambda=1.9] 71.84% 70.40% 68.84% 66.98%
LGS [lambda=1.7] 72.30% 69.55% 67.32% 63.38%
LGS [lambda=1.5] 72.72% 67.68% 64.13% 55.67%
DW 52.77% 67.70% 66.19% 64.57%
MF [window=3] 70.59% 63.90% 62.15% 59.81%
GF [window=5] 61.75% 59.52% 57.68% 55.29%
BF [window=5] 65.70% 61.53% 58.70% 55.59%
JPEG [quality=80] 74.35% 18.14% 6.23% 2.06%
JPEG [quality=60] 72.71% 25.69% 11.86% 4.85%
JPEG [quality=40] 71.20% 37.10% 23.26% 12.73%
JPEG [quality=30] 70.04% 45.00% 33.72% 22.04%
JPEG [quality=20] 67.51% 52.84% 46.25% 37.19%
JPEG [quality=10] 60.25% 53.10% 48.73% 43.59%
TMV [weights=10] 70.21% 14.48% 4.64% 1.73%
TMV [weights=20] 72.85% 13.24% 3.78% 1.17%
TMV [weights=30] 73.85% 12.79% 3.53% 1.04%
BR [depth=1] 39.85% 25.93% 15.14% 9.73%
BR [depth=2] 64.61% 16.32% 6.15% 2.68%
BR [depth=3] 72.83% 13.4% 3.89% 1.25%
Table 1: Summary of Inception v3 performance against LaVAN attack on ImageNet validation set with and without defenses
including local gradient smoothing (LGS), digital watermarking (DW), median filtering (MF), Gaussian filtering (GF), bi-
lateral filtering (BF), JPEG compression, total variance minimization (TVM) and bit-depth reduction (BR). Bold numbers
represent the best accuracy of a certain defense against LAVAN attack.
1000 iterations of attack optimization per image. We ter-
minate the optimization early if classifier mis-classify with
confidence above than or equal to 99% or we let it run for
at max 1000 iterations and attack is considered to be suc-
cessful if the image label is changed to a random target (not
equal to the true object class). Inceptionv3 model accepts
299x299 image as an input. Three adversarial noise masks
with size 42x42 (∼2% of the image), 52x52 (∼3% of the
image) and 60x60 (∼4% of the image) were applied. Ta-
ble 1 presents summary of all the results. For the case of
adversarial patch [4] attack, placing a patch of size 95x95
( 10% of the image) randomly on all Imagenet validation
set was not possible because it would cover most of salient
objects details in an image. So we carefully created 1000
adversarial examples that model misclassified as a toaster
with a confidence score at least 90%. We then applied all the
defense techniques and reported results in Table 2. Figure
3 shows runtime of defense methods to process ImageNet
[18] validation set. We used optimized python implementa-
tions. Specifically, we employed JPEG from Pillow, Total
variance minimization (TVM), and Bilateral filtering (BF)
from scikit-image, Median filtering (MF) and Gaussian fil-
tering (GF) from scipy, and LGS and Bit Depth Reduction
(BR) are written in python 3.6 as well. All experiments
were conducted on desktop windows computer equipped
with Intel i7-7700k quad-core CPU clocked at 4.20GHz and
32GB RAM.
Defense None LGS DW MF JPEG TVM BR
Adversarial
Patch
0% 90.5% 80% 49.10% 45% 1% 0%
Table 2: Accuracy of Inception v3 against adversarial patch
attack with and without defense. The size of adversarial
noise is 95x95 covering ∼10% of image. LGS is used with
λ = 2.3, DW in blind defense scenario, MF with win-
dow equal to 3, JPEG compression with quality equal to 30,
TVM with weights equal to 10 and BR with depth 3. This
hyperparameter choice was made for fair comparison such
that the performance on benign examples from ImageNet is
approximately the same (first column of Table 1). Results
are reported for 1000 adversarial examples misclassified as
toaster with confidence above than 90%.
5.2. Comparison with Related Defenses
In this section, we report comparisons of our approach
with other recent defense methods that transform the in-
put sample to successfully reduce the adversarial effect.
The compared methods include both global and local tech-
niques. Note that our method processes image locally so it
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Figure 3: Computational cost comparison of defense meth-
ods to process 50k ImageNet validation images. Graph is
shown in log scale for better visualization with actual pro-
cessing times written on the top of each bar in seconds.
has advantage over other defenses like JPEG, MF, TVM and
BR that process image globally. First, we provide a brief de-
scription of the competing defenses which will allow us to
elaborate further on the performance trends in Tables 1, 2
and 3.
5.2.1 Digital Watermarking
Hayes et.al [10] presented two, non-blind and blind, defense
strategies to tackle the challenge of localized attacks [12, 4].
Non-blind defense considers a scenario, where defender has
the knowledge of adversarial mask location. This is unlikely
scenario in the context of adversarial attacks because threat
is over immediately, once the adversary provides the mask
location. Localized attacks have the ability to change the
attention of classifier from the original object to adversar-
ial mask. In their blind defense, authors [10] exploited the
attention mechanism by first finding the mask location us-
ing saliency map and then processing that area before in-
ference. Using saliency map to detect adversarial mask lo-
cation is the strength of this defense but at the same time
its also the weakness of defense because on benign exam-
ples, saliency map will give the location of original object
and hence processing original object will decrease the per-
formance on clean examples. Authors [10] reported blind
defense performance to protect VGG19 [21] on only 400
randomly selected images with 12% accuracy drop on clean
images. We have tested this defense on imagenet validation
set [18] (50k images). This method has the second best ac-
curacy on adversarial examples after LGS but its accuracy
on clean examples expectedly dropped by a large margin
(22.8%). Tables 1, 2 and 3 summarizes the performance
of digital watermarking [10].
5.2.2 JPEG Compression
[6, 5, 19] extensively studied JPEG compression to defend
against adversarial attacks. This way high-frequency com-
ponents are removed that are less important to human vision
by using Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT). JPEG performs
compression as follows:
• Convert an RGB image Y CbCr color space, where Y
and Cb, Cr represent luminance and chrominance re-
spectively.
• Down-sample the chrominance channels and apply
DCT to 8× 8 blocks for each channel.
• Perform quantization of frequency amplitudes by di-
viding with a constant and rounding off to the nearest
integer.
As illustrated in Table 1, image quality decreases as the de-
gree of compression increases which in turn decreases ac-
curacy on benign examples. JPEG compression is not very
effective against localized attacks, and its defending ability
decreases a lot against BPDA. JPEG performance compari-
son is shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3 and Figure 4.
5.2.3 Feature Squeezing
The main idea of feature squeezing [26] is to limit the ex-
plorable adversarial space by reducing resolution either by
using bit depth reduction or smoothing filters. We found
that bit reduction is not effective against localized attacks,
however smoothing filter including Gaussian filter, median
filter, and bilateral filter reduces localized adversarial effect
with reasonable accuracy drop on benign examples. Among
smoothing filters, median filter outperforms Gaussian and
bilateral filters. Feature squeezing performance is shown in
Tables 1, 2 and 3 and Figure 4.
5.2.4 Total Variance Minimization (TVM)
Guo et al. [9] considered smoothing adversarial images us-
ing TVM along with JPEG compression and image quilting.
TVM has the ability to measure small variations in the im-
age, and hence it proved effective in removing small pertur-
bations. As illustrated in Table 1, TVM becomes ineffective
against large concentrated variations introduced by the lo-
calized attacks. Further comparisons are shown in Tables 2
and 3 and Figure 4.
5.3. Resilience to BPDA
BPDA [2] is built on the intuition that transformed im-
ages by JPEG or TVM should look similar to original im-
ages, that is, T (x) ≈ x. BPDA approximate gradients for
non-differentiable operators with combined forward propa-
gation through operator and DNN while ignoring operator
(a) Dragonfly
(99%)
(c) Cardoon
(94%)
(e) Cardoon
(91%)
(g) Cardoon
(89%)
(i) Dragonfly
(70%)
(k) Dragonfly
(98%)
(m) Dragonfly
(99%)
(b) Toaster
(94%)
(d) Sandpiper
(89%)
(f) Sandpiper
(45%)
(h) Sandpiper
(55%)
(j) Sandpiper
(28%)
(l) Toaster
(90%)
(n) Toaster
(92%)
Figure 4: Inception v3 confidence score is shown on example images. (a,b) represent adversarial examples generated by
LaVAN and adversarial patch respectively, (c,d) show transformed adversarial images using LGS with lambda equal to 2.3
respectively, (e,f) show transformed adversarial images using DW processing method respectively, (g,h) show transformed
adversarial images using median filter with window size 3 respectively, (i,j) show transformed adversarial images using JPEG
with quality 30 respectively, (k,l) show transformed adversarial images using TVM with weights equal to 10 respectively,
and (m,n) show transformed adversarial images using BR with depth 3.
during the backward pass. This strategy allows BPDA to
approximate true gradients and thus bypassing the defense.
In the traditional attack setting like Projected Gradient De-
scent (PGD) [13], the explorable space available to BPDA
is Rn because it can change each pixel in the image. In lo-
calized attack setting explorable space reduces to Rm<<n
controlled by the mask size. LGS suppresses the high-
frequency noise to near zero thereby significantly reducing
gradient activity in the estimated mask area and restricting
BPDA to bypass defense. However, as it is the case with all
defenses, increasing explorable space, i.e., distance limit in
PGD attack [13] and mask size in the case of localized at-
tack [12], protection ability of defense methods decreases.
To test performance against BPDA in the localized setting,
we randomly selected 1000 examples from Imagenet and
attack is optimized against all defenses for the same target,
location, mask size and number of iterations. Compared to
other defenses methods, LGS significantly reduces the ex-
plorable space for localized adversarial attacks within mask
size equal to ∼ 2% of the image as discussed in [12]. In the
case of DW [10] defense, we tested BPDA against the pro-
posed input processing given the mask location. Summary
of attack success rate against defense methods is presented
in Table 3.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
In this work, we developed a defense against localized
adversarial attacks by studying attack properties in gradi-
ent domain. Defending against continuously evolving ad-
Defense None LGS DW MF JPEG TVM BR
LaVAN with
BPDA
88% 18% 25.6% 75% 73.30% 78.10% 83%
Table 3: Attack success rate against Inception v3 with and
without defense (lower is better). The size of adversarial
noise 42x42 covering ∼2% of image. LGS is used with
λ = 2.3, DW in blind scenario, MF with window equal to
3, JPEG compression with quality equal to 30, TVM with
weights equal to 10 and BR with depth 3. This hyperpa-
rameter choice was made for fair comparison such that the
performance on benign examples from ImageNet is approx-
imately the same (first column of Table 1). Attack is opti-
mized for 1000 randomly selected images for the same tar-
get, location and mask size.
versarial attacks has proven to be very difficult especially
with standalone defenses. We believe that in critical secu-
rity applications, a classifier should be replaced by a robust
classification system with following main decision stages:
• Detection: given the unlimited distortion space, any
image can be converted into an adversarial example
that can bypass any defense system with 100% suc-
cess rate [2]; however, this also pushes the adversarial
example away from the data manifold, and it would be
easier to detect rather than removing the perturbation.
• Projection or Transformation: Adversarial examples
within a small distance of original images can be ei-
ther projected onto the data manifold or transformed
to mitigate the adversarial effect.
• Classification: Final stage should be to perform a for-
ward pass through a DNN, whose robustness is in-
creased via adversarial training.
Our method performs a transformation, so it falls into the
second stage of robust classification systems. LGS out-
performs digital watermarking, JPEG compression, feature
squeezing and TVM against localized adversarial attacks
with minimal drop in accuracy on benign examples. LGS
can be used with a combination of other defense methods,
for example, smoothing filters like low pass filter can be
applied just on the estimated noisy region to enhance pro-
tection for a DNN further.
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